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Yellow fever in nineteenth-century Houston
Nine yellow fever outbreaks from 1839 to 1867, the 1839 toll of about one in eight residents, how coastal quarantine worked and how the mosquito was identified.
In the autumn of 1839, the young city of Houston lost roughly one resident in eight to a disease that nobody understood. The Texas State Historical Association puts the figure at about 12 percent of the population, in a town that had been founded only three years earlier. The same year the capital of the Republic left for Austin. For a place that had grown from a dozen people to a few thousand by promising prosperity, the double blow of 1839 was a hard lesson in how fragile a frontier port could be.
Yellow fever came back again and again. The Handbook of Texas lists outbreaks in Houston in 1839, 1844, 1847, 1848, 1854, 1858, 1859, 1862 and 1867, nine epidemics in twenty-eight years. For a city's first generation, the fever was a regular feature of the late summer and fall, and its arrival was feared in the way a hurricane is feared today.
What the disease was and why it struck here
Yellow fever is a virus, and it is carried from person to person by the bite of a particular mosquito, Aedes aegypti. Victims develop fever, headache and muscle pain, and in the worst cases the skin and eyes turn yellow from liver damage, which gives the disease its name. A fraction of cases are severe and many of those are fatal. Nobody in 1839 knew any of that. Doctors blamed bad air, filth, swamp vapors and "miasma," and they argued over whether the disease was carried by ships, by people or by the climate.
Houston was an ideal place for the fever to spread, for reasons that had nothing to do with anyone's habits. The city sat on a low, flat coastal plain at the head of a slow bayou, in a climate where the average July high is 94.5 F and the nights stay near 75 F, according to NOAA's modern normals. Rain falls throughout the year, about 51.84 inches in the present normals, and the clay soils drain slowly, so standing water was everywhere. The mosquitoes bred in puddles, ditches, cisterns, rain barrels and the water that gathered in the bottoms of boats. In the nineteenth century, a person who needed water stored it, and stored water was a breeding ground.
The port connection mattered too. The disease arrived by sea, in the bodies of infected travelers and perhaps in mosquitoes carried aboard ships, and spread along the coast through the ports. Galveston suffered terribly in the same years, and Houston, connected to Galveston by the bay and the bayou, rode the same wave.
The outbreaks, in order
The list of outbreak years comes from the Handbook of Texas article on Houston. The Handbook's separate article on yellow fever, covering the state, gives a few more details, and the combined record gives a useful sketch.
| Year | What the record says |
|---|---|
| 1839 | The first major outbreak; about 12 percent of Houston's residents died. The Texas government left for Austin the same year. |
| 1844 | An outbreak in Houston; in nearby Galveston the disease took about a third of the population. |
| 1847 | An outbreak in Houston. |
| 1848 | An outbreak in Houston. |
| 1854 | An outbreak in Houston; the state saw serious epidemics in 1853 and 1854. |
| 1858 | An outbreak in Houston. |
| 1859 | An outbreak in Houston. |
| 1862 | An outbreak in Houston, in the middle of the Civil War. |
| 1867 | The last major nineteenth-century outbreak: 492 of Houston's roughly 6,000 residents died, according to the state historical association's yellow fever article. |
The last figure deserves a calculation. 492 divided by 6,000 is 0.082, or about 8.2 percent of the city's people, in a single season. The 1839 toll, at about 12 percent, was higher. Both numbers describe a city in which nearly everyone knew someone who had died.
The quarantine response
With no cure and no understanding of the cause, the main tool was isolation. The disease was understood to come from somewhere else, and communities defended themselves by closing their doors.
The Handbook's yellow fever article describes the measures. Concerned citizens set up quarantines, including what the historians call "shotgun quarantines" that turned away anyone suspected of carrying the disease. Trains were stopped, travelers were held in detention camps, and ships were treated with chemicals. Rival cities regarded one another with suspicion: Galveston and New Orleans, in particular, blamed each other for outbreaks. The Handbook also notes that cities often concealed outbreaks because news of an epidemic drove away people and commerce, and they were anxious to encourage immigration.
That last point explains much of the politics. A city dependent on newcomers and trade could not afford to admit it had a plague, and so officials sometimes downplayed the death toll or the disease itself. A newspaper in a rival town might do the opposite. The result was a regional atmosphere of rumor and mistrust, with an immediate cost to commerce, which is why coastal quarantine mattered so much. The TSHA's Houston entry notes that the disease was eventually brought under control by quarantine of the coast, though the scientific explanation took another generation.
Residents who could leave did. In an outbreak, a city's population could fall as families went to the country, and those who stayed behind were disproportionately the poor, the newly arrived and the people who tended the sick. Newcomers who had no prior exposure were especially vulnerable, which is one reason a city that was growing by immigration paid so high a price.
Reading the numbers against Galveston's
Houston's neighbor on the coast kept a closer record, and the comparison is instructive. In 1867, the state historical association says, Galveston lost about 1,000 of its 22,000 residents to yellow fever. That is 1,000 divided by 22,000, or about 4.5 percent. In the same season Houston lost 492 of about 6,000, or 8.2 percent. The smaller city, in other words, lost nearly twice the share of its people. In 1844, Galveston lost about a third of its population.
The comparison cuts two ways. It suggests that the smaller, less developed city was in some ways more exposed, with fewer doctors, fewer resources and a population still crowded into a few streets. It also shows that the two ports were part of one disease region, which is why shotgun quarantines, train stoppages and detention camps were organized against neighbors and not just strangers. The fever respected no municipal boundary, and the response, which looked at first like a local matter, was a regional one.
What people did in a fever year
The measures the Handbook lists suggest the pattern of a fever year. Neighbors stopped traveling. Trains that would normally bring freight and passengers were halted at the edge of town or held at a distance. Ships that arrived from infected ports were fumigated, quarantined or turned away. Business slowed as buyers and sellers avoided the place, and local officials weighed the cost of announcing a plague against the cost of hiding one.
For a household, the choices were narrow. A family with the means left town for the countryside, where the mosquito was less common. A family without the means stayed and relied on a doctor, a neighbor or a nurse. The disease ran its course in days, and the survivors gained immunity, which is why a newcomer without it was at greater risk than a long-time resident. The same fact is part of why the epidemics tended to follow waves of immigration: each new arrival who had never been exposed was a fresh case waiting to happen.
How the answer arrived
The solution came from a series of discoveries around the turn of the century. The Cuban epidemiologist Carlos Finlay had proposed in 1879 that a mosquito carried the disease. In 1900, a U.S. Army commission under Major Walter Reed confirmed it, showing that Aedes aegypti was the carrier. After Reed's death, Major William C. Gorgas led a sanitation campaign in Havana that aimed to eliminate the mosquito, and the methods he used became a model for other cities.
The practical lesson was dull and effective: remove the places where the mosquito breeds. Cover cisterns and water barrels, drain standing water, screen windows and pour oil on ponds that cannot be drained. Texas cities adopted the practices and cleared standing water. The Handbook notes that one more epidemic struck Texas in 1905, and after that the disease no longer appeared as a recurring plague.
This coincided with a wave of public works in Houston itself. The state historical association notes that Houston's 1902 sewer system was "among the best in the nation," and in 1906 the city took over the private water works. The details of those projects are covered in How Houston took over its water works in 1906. The point for this story is that the shift from private cisterns and backyard wells to piped municipal water and sewers removed many of the places where the mosquito had bred. A history of public health in a city is often a history of pipes.
What the fever left behind
Yellow fever shaped the city in several ways that are easy to miss.
It set the tone of civic life. A city that had lost one in eight of its people in 1839 learned to treat public health as a matter of survival. The idea that government could and should act to keep residents alive, through quarantine, sanitation and eventually clean water, took root early.
It linked Houston's fate to its neighbors'. Houston's outbreaks coincided with Galveston's, and the long rivalry between the two ports, which would be settled in Houston's favor after the 1900 Galveston storm and the ship channel, was partly a rivalry over who could keep the fever out. See The 1900 Galveston hurricane and Houston's rise.
It is a reminder of the climate. The same warmth and rainfall that made Houston a hospitable home for mosquitoes make it a hospitable home for them today. The city no longer faces yellow fever, but standing water after a storm is still a matter for public health. Flood preparedness in Houston covers what residents are advised to do before and after floods, and the Houston Health Department's pages describe its programs; see Houston Health Department.
What to take from it
The history of yellow fever in Houston is more than a list of dates. It shows a city learning, painfully, that growth does not guarantee survival. The Allens had promised a "great interior commercial emporium." What they could not promise was a healthy one, and the first decades were a story of a town rebuilding after each epidemic and finding its way toward modern public health.
The Handbook of Texas entries on Houston and on yellow fever are at tshaonline.org. For the year-by-year frame that places the epidemics inside the larger story, see The first year of Houston, 1836 to 1837 and A capital for two years, Houston 1837 to 1839.