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Hurricane Beryl and the power grid
A Category 1 storm on July 8, 2024 left over 2.2 million CenterPoint customers dark; the state's review found failures in communication and tree management.
Hurricane Beryl was not a strong storm by the scale used for hurricanes. It came ashore near Matagorda, Texas, on July 8, 2024, as a Category 1 hurricane with 90 mile-per-hour winds, and by the time it crossed Greater Houston it had weakened to a tropical storm. What made it a landmark in Houston's recent history was what happened to the electric system afterward. At the peak, more than 2.2 million customers of CenterPoint Energy, about 80 percent of the electricity customers in the Houston region, were without power, in July heat, for days. The criticism that followed, of preparation, communication and the pace of restoration, produced a state investigation, a management audit and a round of legislative discussion.
This is a case study from the public record, with each side's argument as it appears there. It does not rank blame; it explains what happened, what the state's investigation found and what a household can do about the next outage.
The storm and the outage count
Beryl's center made landfall near Matagorda at about 3:40 a.m. Houston time on July 8 and moved northward across the Houston area, weakening to a tropical storm at about 1 p.m. while crossing the city. The strongest measured winds were along the coast. A station in Galveston Bay recorded sustained winds of 73 miles per hour with gusts to 82, and a gust of 97 miles per hour was recorded in Brazoria County. Winds of that strength are capable of knocking down trees and distribution lines, and they did.
More than 2.7 million households and businesses across the region lost power, of which about 2.2 million were CenterPoint customers. Restoration took days. On the evening of July 10, more than 1.6 million customers across the region were still without power, including about 1.3 million CenterPoint customers. The National Weather Service issued a heat advisory for southeast Texas on July 9, warning of heat indexes up to 106 F, and temperatures reached or topped 100 F for several days. The combination of heat, a long outage and no air conditioning is what turned an inconvenience into an emergency for many households. The mechanics of Houston summer heat are explained in 111 days at 90 degrees, Houston heat in numbers.
Who is responsible for the power
An outage raises an immediate question: who do you call? In most of Houston, the answer is a company you may not have heard of. Electricity in this part of Texas is sold by retail electric providers, which compete for customers, but the poles, wires and meters that deliver it are owned and operated by a regulated delivery utility, which for most of Greater Houston is CenterPoint Energy. When power goes out because a tree falls on a line, the delivery utility is the one that restores it, whichever company sends the bill. The state's Public Utility Commission regulates the delivery utility, and the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, ERCOT, operates the statewide grid. The household-level explanation is in Electricity and gas in Houston, who does what.
CenterPoint's outage reporting line for the Greater Houston area is 713-207-2222, or 800-332-7143, and its natural gas emergency line is separate. The city's emergency management office and its alert system are described in Houston Office of Emergency Management.
Where it went wrong: communication
The Public Utility Commission's investigation was directed by the governor, who set a December 1 deadline, and the commission adopted its report on November 21, 2024. Its first and plainest finding concerned communication. The report said CenterPoint's outage tracker failed before Hurricane Beryl, so customers could not get critical information about when their power would return. The tracker had been out of service since the May 2024 derecho, as described in The May 2024 derecho in Houston, and CenterPoint had said it would replace the tool with a redesigned platform; it launched a new outage tracker in August.
The commission's recommendations on communication went beyond CenterPoint. It suggested that lawmakers codify a customer's right to speak with a live person for outage and restoration updates, and it said utilities need to improve communications with neighboring utilities, local governments and emergency services as part of storm drills.
Where it went wrong: trees and poles
The second theme was vegetation and equipment. Fallen trees caused many of the outages during Beryl, and the commission found that most vegetation-related outages came from trees outside utility easements and rights-of-way, meaning trees the utility has limited authority to trim. Analysts quoted in coverage at the time noted that Texas has no standard for vegetation management. The report suggested that the commission require utilities to set up a way for customers to report vegetation hazards, and it recommended a more standardized series of pole inspections and replacement of poles that do not meet current wind standards.
Residents of heavily wooded areas, including Kingwood, described the problem plainly, saying that storms regularly down lines in their neighborhoods and that clearing the paths for the lines should be a priority. The neighborhood is profiled in Kingwood.
Penalties and the question of incentives
The report also raised a question about how the state's penalty system works. It noted that the maximum penalty for service quality violations is $25,000 per day, but that violations are calculated on an annual average and fines are often less than $100,000, and it observed that it may be cheaper for a utility to pay the penalty than to fix the problems that cause longer and more frequent outages. It recommended that the Legislature consider raising the maximum penalty.
The penalty question is one the Legislature, not the commission, would have to settle, since the cap is set in law. Tree trimming and pole replacement also cost money, and in a regulated system the cost of what a utility spends is part of what the commission weighs when it sets rates, which is why the argument over resilience is also an argument over customer bills.
The utility's response
CenterPoint's chief executive apologized to customers after the storm and promised improvements. The company launched the new outage tracker, and it faced separate scrutiny over its use of mobile generators. A management audit by the commission, running in parallel with the investigation, covers the company's leasing of mobile generation units and its decision not to deploy leased large generators during restoration. The Texas attorney general also opened an investigation. The cost of the storm to the company's infrastructure was estimated in the range of $1.2 billion to $1.3 billion, and the question of how much of it customers will pay is a rate matter before the commission.
A timeline
- May 16, 2024: The derecho knocks out power to hundreds of thousands of customers, and CenterPoint's outage tracker goes offline.
- July 7: CenterPoint tells customers it plans to replace the tracker with a redesigned, cloud-based platform.
- July 8: Beryl makes landfall near Matagorda as a Category 1 hurricane and crosses Greater Houston as a tropical storm.
- July 9: The National Weather Service issues a heat advisory for southeast Texas.
- July 10: More than 1.6 million customers across the region are still without power in the evening.
- July 25: The Public Utility Commission meets with CenterPoint; commissioners say some of the changes the company describes should have been under way before the storm.
- August: CenterPoint launches a new outage tracker.
- November 21: The commission adopts its investigative report, ahead of the governor's December 1 deadline.
- Early 2025: A commission audit of CenterPoint, running on its own schedule, is expected to conclude before the end of the 2025 legislative session in May.
What the commission recommended
The report's recommendations fall into a few groups, which are worth knowing because they are what the Legislature and the commission can act on:
- Communication: make it a legal right to reach a live person for outage updates; require pre-storm communication procedures in utilities' emergency operations plans.
- Coordination: include neighboring utilities, local governments and emergency services in annual hurricane and major storm drills.
- Vegetation: let customers report hazards, and consider a state standard for tree management.
- Equipment: standardize pole inspections and replace poles that do not meet current wind standards.
- Penalties: consider raising the $25,000-a-day cap on service-quality penalties.
Questions of cost
The storm cost CenterPoint's infrastructure an estimated $1.2 billion to $1.3 billion. Who pays is a regulatory question, and it is separate from the performance review. The commission's own site posts its decisions on rates and on the company's plans.
What a household can do
The structural questions will take years to settle. The practical steps for a household are within reach:
- Know who delivers your power and how to reach them. The CenterPoint outage line is on your bill and above.
- Sign up for the utility's alert service and the city's AlertHouston notifications, covered in Signing up for AlertHouston and STEAR.
- Register with STEAR if anyone in the household depends on powered medical equipment or has limited mobility, as described in STEAR, who should register. Registration does not guarantee service, but it gives local planners information.
- Plan for heat as well as dark. The steps for a multi-day outage, including where to go, are in Power outages in Houston, what to do and heat-health alerts and cooling centers.
- Check on neighbors, especially older ones and anyone with a medical need.
Why it matters beyond one storm
Beryl was the second major power event in Houston in less than two months in 2024, after the May derecho, and it came in a region already marked by Hurricane Ike and Hurricane Harvey. The fact that a Category 1 storm could cut power to more than two million customers shows how much of Houston's resilience depends on wires and poles, not only on levees and bayous. The state's report and audit, and the legislative sessions that follow them, are the places where that is being decided. For the broader hurricane record, see Hurricane Harvey, what the National Hurricane Center recorded and Hurricane Ike and the Houston bay area.